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M. Todd Henderson & William H.J. Hubbard† 
ABSTRACT 
Do judges follow the law? In a naïve model of judging, Con-
gress writes statutes, which courts know about and then slavish-
ly apply. Although interpretation differences could explain devi-
ation between congressional will and the law as applied, in this 
model there should be no divergence where the law is unambig-
uous. Section 21D(c)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act is such a 
clear law: it requires courts to certify attorneys complied with 
Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which forbids 
frivolous or unsupported claims, in every case arising under the 
Act. In this paper, we provide data that rejects the naïve model: 
courts make the required findings in less than 14 percent of cas-
es in which such findings were required by law. This suggests 
judges either do not know of the law or, if they do, fail to follow 
it. We also show that required Rule 11(b) findings about sanc-
tions are made overwhelmingly in cases where sanctions would 
be least likely – that is, in orders approving settlements – and 
such findings are extremely rare in cases where sanctions would 
other be more likely – that is, where motions to dismiss are 
granted. To explain this seeming paradox, we offer an account 
that highlights crucial ways in which the incentives of the judge 
and of the attorneys may interact in complex cases.
† M. Todd Henderson is the Professor of Law and Aaron Director 
Teaching Scholar at the University of Chicago Law School. William H. 
J. Hubbard is an Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Chi-
cago Law School. We thank the Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & 
Economics for generous research support, we thank Charles Zhang 
and Wooju Lee for invaluable research assistance, and we thank Tom 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In our governmental system, the three branches exert control over 
each other in a variety of direct and indirect ways, many of which are 
built into the constitutional system. For instance, Congress uses its 
purse-string power and ability to hold hearings to influence executive 
branch actions. When it comes to controlling judges, however, the op-
tions are more limited. Once “inferior” courts are created, the Constitu-
tion forbids Congress to alter the terms of employment of federal judg-
es.1 With the most straightforward option foreclosed by the Constitu-
tion, Congress must rely on other approaches. So how does Congress 
get judges to act the way it wants? 
Most obviously, Congress can change the substance of the law.2 
When Congress changes the elements of a cause of action this is a 
command to courts to act in a particular way. But Congress cannot 
force courts to do anything directly, including requiring that judges 
know the law and follow it. While we have no doubt judges want to do 
both of these things more or less, the intensity of this desire is likely to 
vary by judge and by issue. As such, we hypothesize that any legal 
change will work only imperfectly. For instance, in this paper, we 
study a congressional command for judges to make particular findings 
in every securities case, but find they do in less than 14 percent of cas-
es.  
In the absence of direct methods of control, Congress must rely on 
indirect mechanisms. In many situations, Congress can rely on the 
parties to the litigation to educate judges and press for enforcement of 
statutory commands. This is likely in the case of the substantive legal 
changes. For instance, if Congress requires that misrepresentations be 
deliberate, rather than negligent, for damages to be awarded in securi-
ties fraud cases, it can reasonably assume that a defendant will have 
strong incentive to ensure the statute is enforced. Thus, even if the tri-
al court ignored the law, either out of ignorance or defiance, Congress 
could be fairly sure the defendant would raise the issue on appeal.3 In 
1 Article III, Section 1. 
2 Congress can hold hearings or publicize information about judicial activi-
ties, but this is likely limited to issues that are relatively easy to measure, 
such as docket management. For instance, Congress has published data on 
court speed and efficiency in the so-called Biden Reports, and there is anecdo-
tal evidence this is an effective mechanism of control on this issue. 
3 The appellate judges are also only imperfect agents of Congress, but adding 
three or twelve more judges would, all else being equal, increase the probabil-
ity of compliance. 
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short, the parties with a stake in the new substantive rule will raise 
the costs of non-compliance by the trial court, thereby increasing the 
probability of compliance. 
Where Congress cannot rely on the parties to vigorously press legal 
duties on courts, congressional control over courts is likely to be less. 
We predict the incentives of the judges and the parties to know and fol-
low the law are lower in the case of procedural changes to the law. To 
see the intuition, consider a hypothetical congressional attempt to re-
quire courts to decide cases in particular number of days (e.g., five 
days). Some judges might know the rule and slavishly apply the law, 
but others might not if they have interests, such as leisure or seeking 
“justice,” that outweigh their interests in knowing and following the 
law (that is, the time constraint). Unlike the case of a substantive 
change in law, the parties may not try to enforce the congressional 
command. This may be because a delay may benefit both parties (or 
both parties’ lawyers), the issue could be resolved as part of a settle-
ment, the lawyers may not want to press the issue for fear of antago-
nizing the court or the other lawyers, or for a host of other reasons. 
With no one to complain, the statutory command is more likely to be 
avoided. 
In this paper, we test judicial compliance with a statutory command 
to make certain findings in every securities case in order to gain some 
insight into this dynamic. The object of study is section 78u-4(c) of the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA),4 which add-
ed section 21D(c) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The PSLRA, 
which was passed over President Clinton’s veto, was designed to re-
duce the number of frivolous securities lawsuits filed in federal court. 
The law introduces several reforms to securities class actions, includ-
ing changing how lead plaintiffs are selected and the raising pleading 
standards for fraud. In addition, through section 21D(c), it tries to in-
crease the use of sanctions against attorneys for frivolous actions by 
4 The PSLRA was passed in response to a perception that much securities lit-
igation was frivolous or filed for nuisance value (Choi 2004). In addition to 
the changes described in the text, the PSLRA made several changes to the 
law governing private securities litigation. First, it designates the plaintiff 
with the largest financial interest as the presumptive “lead plaintiff,” mean-
ing the lawyers will be chosen by parties with economic stakes in the litiga-
tion. See Section 27(a)(3), Securities Act; Section 21D(a)(3), Exchange Act. 
Second, it stays discovery until after a ruling on a motion to dismiss. See Sec-
tion 27(b), Securities Act; Section 21D(b)(3)(B), Exchange Act. Third, it re-
quires plaintiffs to plead with particularity facts giving rise to a strong infer-
ence that defendants acted with scienter in making any alleged misrepresen-
tations. See Securities Act; Section 21D(b)(2), Exchange Act. Fourth, the 
statute requires courts to review attorney fees for reasonableness. See Sec-
tion 27(a)(6), Securities Act; Section 21D(a)(6), Exchange Act. 
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requiring the district court, upon “final adjudication”5 of a case brought 
under the Exchange Act, to include  
in the record specific findings regarding compliance by each par-
ty and each attorney representing any party with each require-
ment of Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as to 
any complaint, responsive pleading, or dispositive motion.6  
Rule 11(b) requires all papers filed with a court are “not being present-
ed for any improper purpose,” that all claims “are warranted by exist-
ing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending . . . existing law,” 
and that “the factual contentions have evidentiary support or . . . will 
likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for . . . 
discovery.” If the court finds that Rule 11 has been violated, the 
PSLRA mandates the imposition of sanctions and creates a rebuttable 
presumption that the appropriate sanction is the award of attorneys’ 
fees and costs.7  
The most unusual and most interesting feature of section 21D(c)(1) 
is that explicit Rule 11 findings are mandatory in every case decided 
on the merits or settled. The statute does not rely on the parties to 
bring sanctions motions against the opposing counsel or merely em-
power courts to raise issues of sanctions sua sponte,8 as was the case 
prior to the law, but rather requires courts to make specific findings 
about compliance with Rule 11. This makes section 21D(c)(1) uniquely 
useful to the empirical study of judicial behavior for two reasons. 
5 The statute does not define “final adjudication”, but courts define the term 
to include dismissals or judgments that terminate (with prejudice) proceed-
ings in the district court. Blaser v. Bessemer Trust Co., No. 01 Civ. 11599, 
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19856, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2002) (voluntary dis-
missal without prejudice does not trigger obligation); Dimarco v. Depotech 
Corp., 131 F. Supp. 2d 1185 (S.D. Cal. 2001) (trial verdict triggers command, 
even if appeal pending). This means that any settlement, dismissal with 
prejudice (either at the motion to dismiss or summary judgment phase), and 
verdict must be accompanied by an on-the-record finding regarding Rule 11 
compliance. 
6 Section 21D(c)(1), Exchange Act. Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure is one of the primary procedural mechanism for disciplining attorneys 
who misuse the federal courts. The current version of the rule prohibits, 
among other things, lawyers from filing documents with a court that are 
“presented for any improper purpose.” FRCP 11(b). This includes filing un-
supported or frivolous claims for purely nuisance value. If a court, either on 
its own or after the motion of a party, finds that Rule 11 has been violated, 
the rule permits (but does not require) the court to “impose an appropriate 
sanction on [the] attorney.” FRCP 11(c). 
7 See 15 U.S.C. § 21D(c)(1)(3)(A)(ii). 
8 The parties and the court had these powers prior to the statutory change. 
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First, a statutory mandate that judges act in a certain way is the 
clearest and most direct way that Congress can attempt to control ju-
dicial behavior. Yet, mandates as absolute as section 21D(c)(1) are ra-
re, which suggests that the most obvious method of controlling judicial 
behavior may not be the most effective. The conventional wisdom 
among practitioners is that district courts do not routinely comply with 
the section 21D(c)(1) requirement, and some appellate cases noting the 
failure of district courts to make the required findings.9 Therefore sec-
tion 21D(c)(1) provides an opportunity to explore the determinants of 
judicial behavior that flouts a congressional command. 
Second, such an absolute requirement to make express findings 
provides a rare opportunity to study judicial behavior free from the 
usual host of concerns about selection effects that attend to any at-
tempt to study judicial responses to legal change. Most legal rules 
(whether court-made or legislative) will only affect the behavior of the 
judge in appropriate cases; for example, a rule setting limits on puni-
tive damages will only affect cases where punitive damages are likely 
to be high, or a rule raising pleading standards will only affect com-
plaints with sketchy allegations. In such cases, we expect that parties, 
attorneys, and judges will all alter their behavior in response to the le-
gal rule. This will bias any data set, and therefore confound any poten-
tial conclusions from observing the data. 
Further, when one studies the effect of judicial characteristics on 
case outcomes, there is the concern that the mix of cases that reaches 
any given set of judges is itself a function of those judges’ characteris-
tics; for example, parties may settle different cases depending on 
whether a court tends to be liberal or conservative, expert or not in a 
particular area, and so on. If so, the comparing case outcomes in, say, a 
liberal court with case outcomes in a conservative court does not con-
trol for potential differences in the composition of cases. 
Of course, there are various ways to address these concerns, and in 
the judicial behavior context, at least, selection effects may not be a 
first-order problem to begin with.10 But it is even better to dispense 
9 For example, in both Simon DeBartolo Group, L.P. v. Richard E. Jacobs 
Group, Inc. (186 F.3d 157, [2d Cir.1999]) and Dellastatious v. Williams (242 
F.3d 191 [4th Cir. 2001]), the appeals court noted that the district court failed 
to making on-the-record findings regarding Rule 11 compliance. 
10 For example, the Priest-Klein model of selection effects in litigation pre-
dicts that, in the limit, only cases that are toss-ups are litigated, while the 
rest of cases settle. If so, then the judicial characteristics of a given court 
should have no effect; plaintiff win rates should approach 50 percent, regard-
less of judicial ideology. Given that this selection effect should attenuate any 
true effects of judicial ideology, then observed correlations between judicial 
ideology and plaintiff win rates represent conservative estimates of the causal 
relationship. 
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with selection effects altogether. Section 21D(c)(1) does so, by imposing 
a blanket requirement for findings regardless of which securities cases 
get filed, regardless of whether the cases are settled or tried, and even 
regardless of who prevails.11 At first blush, at least, neither parties nor 
judges should be able to avoid the mandates of section 21D(c)(1), so 
long as the plaintiff files suit and the court has jurisdiction. Thus, em-
pirical analysis of section 21D(c)(1) compliance should have a what-
you-see-is-what-you-get property—what appears to be a low response 
of courts to section 21D(c)(1) really is a low response of courts to sec-
tion 21D(c)(1)! 
The simplicity that section 21D(c)(1) offers in terms of causal infer-
ence, however, comes at a cost of data complexity. To show non-
compliance with the requirement of explicit findings, we must prove a 
negative: that in a given private securities lawsuit in federal court, the 
district court judge never made section 21D(c)(1) findings. Reliance on 
published opinions is inadequate to the task, as the findings may ap-
pear in an unpublished order.  
To explore the courts’ treatment of section 21D(c)(1), therefore, we 
construct by hand a dataset of PACER docket records of all private se-
curities lawsuits filed in federal court from 1994 to 2008. We conduct 
textual analysis of these docket sheets and then collect and parse the 
text of all court orders that could plausibly contain section 21D(c)(1) 
findings. This process involved the parsing of more than 20,000 docket 
sheets and more than 7,000 court orders, primarily by automated text 
analysis but in the final round of review by individual human review. 
This process so far has resulted in a dataset of over 1,000 cases in 
which there was sufficient text-searchable docket material to make a 
determination as to the presence or absence of section 21D(c)(1) find-
ings. 
With this dataset, we investigate three aspects of securities litiga-
tion under the PSLRA. First, we investigate the extent to which the 
congressional command in section 21D(c)(1) has led district courts to 
make Rule 11 findings in every securities case. Our findings confirm 
the conventional wisdom we had gleaned from attorney anecdotes and 
appellate cases. Courts make section 21D(c)(1) findings infrequently. 
We observe on-the-record findings regarding Rule 11 compliance in 
less than 14 percent of all cases. 
Second, having rejected the naïve model of judging, we describe an 
alternative but informal model of judging and litigant behavior that 
provides a framework for understanding why we observe so little com-
11 Presumably, the impetus for the Section 21D(c)(1) requirement was frivo-
lous complaints filed by plaintiffs, but the language of the statute makes no 
such distinctions. And in at least one case, a court entered Section 21D(c)(1) 
findings that imposed sanctions on a defendant for filing frivolous answers. 
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pliance with the law. This discussion also examines some of the subtle 
and sophisticated ways in which parties and judges can evade the ap-
plication of section 21D(c)(1), despite its seemingly comprehensive 
scope. 
Third, we test some of the hypotheses generated by our informal 
model against the data to identify the determinants of compliance and 
non-compliance. We find that congressional attempts to direct judicial 
behavior depend on a complex mix of incentives of the parties and oth-
er courts. In this respect, the paper combines elements of two closely 
related literatures: judicial behavior and litigant behavior. 
Our insight helps resolve an apparent paradox we observe in the 
data described below. Although obligated by law to make findings 
about the frivolousness of pleadings in every securities case, judges 
make the required findings mostly in cases where there is the least 
impetus for a sanction – that is, a proposed settlement agreement that 
the court approves – and very rarely in cases where there is the most 
reason for a sanction – that is, an extremely tenuous complaint that is 
the subject of a motion to dismiss.12  
Section 2 introduces a suite of hypotheses that organize our think-
ing about the patterns we might expect to see in compliance with sec-
tion 21D(c)(1) and the empirical predictions that we can test with the 
data. Section 3 describes our dataset, and Section 4 presents our em-
pirical results and returns to the accounts of judicial behavior in Sec-
tion 2 to synthesize them with the data and each other. We present an 
informal, intuitive account of judge and litigant behavior that explains 
the observed patterns of limited compliance with the congressional 
mandate. Section 5 tries to explain how the incentives of the judges 
and the parties operates in the course of actual cases. Section 6 con-
cludes. 
2. Hypotheses Regarding Compliance with Section 21D(c)(1) 
In this section, we develop a series of empirical predictions that we 
can bring to the data. We organize these predictions around several ac-
counts, each of which relies on different, but closely related, assump-
tions about the nature of judicial behavior.  
12 Courts rarely makes section 21D(c) findings in these cases because the 
complaint will get dismissed at least once without prejudice, and the plaintiff 
at that point can simply decline to refile to avoid further judicial scrutiny. 
Although technically the court would still be obligated to make findings upon 
expiration of the period in which the plaintiff can refile, this never happens. 
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2.1 The Perfect Agent Account 
The simplest account of how courts might comply with the section 
21D(c)(1) requirement is that courts know the law and apply the law 
perfectly and faithfully to congressional command. While we fully ex-
pect the data to reject this account, it serves as a baseline against 
which to compare competing accounts. A weaker version of this ac-
count might predict that although compliance is not perfect and con-
sistent, findings are more likely in cases with weaker merits or a 
greater likelihood of sanctionable conduct.13 As an empirical matter, of 
course, perhaps the hardest characteristic of a lawsuit to measure ob-
jectively is its merit. One proxy we use is the level of sanctions activity 
in a case, but this is likely a weak proxy.14 To test this account, we ex-
amine whether compliance with the rule is routine, and to the extent it 
is not, whether compliance is correlated with sanctions activity. 
Our initial account of court behavior makes three assumptions that 
more nuanced theories of judicial behavior described below relax: (1) 
judges are perfectly informed; (2) judges are unconstrained by effort or 
attention; (3) judges’ preferences for the dispositions of cases conform 
to the principal’s policy preferences. Relaxing one or more of these as-
sumptions allows us to generate a set of potentially overlapping ac-
counts of how courts might respond to the congressional mandate in 
section 21D(c)(1). We discuss several of these accounts below. 
2.2 Relaxing the Perfect Information Assumption: The Learn-
ing Account 
One reason why judges may not perfectly apply the law is that they 
do not know the law. Federal district court judges are generalists, and 
it is probable that the minutiae of specialty area, like securities law, is 
beyond the ken of the average judge. A pure learning account would 
surmise that judges would always apply the rule, if only they knew 
about it. A more “realist” learning account would allow for the possibil-
ity of knowing non-compliance with the rule, but would nonetheless 
predict that compliance with the rule would be an increasing function 
13 This could be the behavior of a “perfect agent” if the purpose of Section 
21D(c)(1) is merely to encourage sanctioning behavior, and in particular sua 
sponte sanctions, by courts. 
14 The filing of motions for sanctions may reflect the aggressiveness of a par-
ty’s litigation strategy as it reflects the underlying merits of a claim, and 
which party’s litigation strategy upon which it reflects—the moving party or 
the responding party—is also ambiguous. Thus, sanctions activity appears 
below in discussions of non-merits-related determinants of Section 21D(c)(1) 
findings as well. 
                                               
 January 10, 2014  /  DO JUDGES FOLLOW THE LAW?  /  9 
of exposure to the rule. Judges gain knowledge with experience, either 
directly from cases they work on, or from cases from other judges in 
their district, or from other sources. 
To test this account, we look for evidence that judges are more like-
ly to make section 21D(c)(1) findings as time passes, as they encounter 
more post-PSLRA securities cases, either through their own cases or 
perhaps second-hand through the experience of other judges in their 
district.  
2.3 Relaxing the Unlimited Effort Assumption: The Judicial 
Inertia Account 
Relaxing the assumption that judges have unlimited effort and at-
tention to devote to each case allows us to address the reality that dis-
trict court judges must dispose of hundreds of cases per year, and thus 
cannot devote perfect attention to the legal details of any given case. In 
some ways this account relates to the learning account, as learning 
takes effort, and thus limitations to judicial attention and effort may 
manifest themselves in the failure to acquire new information. 
It may also manifest itself in the force of habit, for example, as 
judges appointed before the PSLRA may simply continue to use their 
pre-PSLRA opinion templates and case management practices in spite 
of the new requirements of the law. To test this account, in addition to 
tests described elsewhere, we look at sanctions activity within a law-
suit as a proxy for legal argumentation that may remind or require the 
judge to make findings. 
We also look for differences in compliance rates among judges ap-
pointed before and after the effective date of the PSLRA,15 and we use 
proxies for judges with diminished energy and involvement in litiga-
tion (senior status) and for judges with greater administrative respon-
sibilities and involvement (chief judge status).16 In this account, senior 
and chief judge status should both be correlated with lower compli-
ance, as the greater responsibilities of a chief judge may dilute the 
judge’s attention to individual case details. 
15 For a similar approach in the context of guidelines sentencing, see Yang 
(2013). 
16 These measures may also be relevant to the learning account, to the extent 
that senior judges have diminished exposure to new cases, and chief judges 
have greater exposure to new cases and developments in the district as a 
whole. 
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2.4 Relaxing the Shared Preferences Assumption: The Judi-
cial Ideology Account 
Another way to relax the assumptions of the perfect agent account 
is to allow for the influence of the judge’s policy preferences on the 
judge’s behavior. This is grist for the mill of judicial behavior research, 
so we will not belabor this concept here. But, as a well-known example 
from prior research suggests, politics may matter. The PSLRA was a 
centerpiece of the Republicans Contract with America after they took 
over Congress in 1994, and opposition to the plaintiffs’ bar has contin-
ued to be a Republican issue. If we assume that conservative judges 
are likely to be less sympathetic than liberal judges to plaintiffs in se-
curities lawsuits, and that section 21D(c)(1) more often can be deployed 
against plaintiffs than defendants, it seems fair to assume that section 
21D(c)(1) findings may be employed more often by conservative judges 
than liberal judges. 
To test this account, we rely upon the adjusted common space 
scores for judicial ideology, which reflect political ideology of the ap-
pointing president, adjusted to account for senatorial courtesy by re-
placing the president’s score with the common space score of the 
judge’s home state’s senator (if any) of the same party as the appoint-
ing president (or the average of both senators if both share the same 
party as the president). 
2.5 Introducing Monitoring: The Appellate Oversight Account 
Once one relaxes the assumptions underlying the perfect agent ac-
count, a principal-agent problem emerges, in which the principal (Con-
gress) may want a mechanism to increase the agent’s compliance with 
the principal’s laws.17 While Congress cannot directly discipline the 
failure of a district judge to make section 21D(c)(1) findings, the courts 
of appeals can. As noted above, a number of appellate opinions have 
noted the failure of the district court to make required findings.18 If 
district judges are averse to reversal, then appellate precedent in their 
circuit acknowledging the section 21D(c)(1) requirement may induce 
greater compliance with the rule. 
17 It is worth emphasizing our choice of the verb “may.” As we will discuss be-
low, non-compliance with the letter of Section 21D(c)(1) does not necessarily 
indicate that there has been a failure of the courts to effectuate the ends of 
the PSLRA. 
18 A full list of appellate cases is found in the Appendix. We found at least 9 
cases, from 1999 to 2013, in which appeals courts remanded to district courts 
to comply with the statutory requirement. 
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To test this account, we focus on two sets of circuits. First, there are 
three circuits in which the circuit has remanded a case to the district 
court to make findings under section 21D(c)(1) after noting a district 
court’s failure to make such findings.19 We examine whether these cir-
cuits display a higher rate of compliance after these opinions than be-
fore, relative to circuits with no such appellate discipline.20  
Second, there are three circuits in which the circuit court has noted 
that a district court erred by failing to make findings under section 
78u-3(c), but did not remand the case, choosing instead to make the 
necessary findings in the appellate opinion itself.21 While this second 
set of circuits, like the first, show a willingness to police compliance 
with section 21D(c)(1), they also show a willingness to relieve the dis-
trict courts of the responsibility of making findings if such findings can 
be made on appeal. Thus, we expect that the effect of appellate prece-
dent in this latter context on compliance with section 21D(c)(1) to be 
negative, in that it reveals a lack of penalty (in the form of remand) for 
failure to comply. 
2.6 Introducing Litigant Strategy: The Role of the Case and 
the Lawyers 
While the focus of this paper, and the conference to which this pa-
per attempts to contribute, is judicial behavior, we hypothesize that 
litigant behavior is major determinant of judicial behavior in the con-
text of section 21D(c)(1).22 Most of the extant literature of judicial be-
havior, however, has not emphasized the role of litigant behavior. This 
seems to be due to at least two factors. First, most past studies focus 
on appellate courts, and in particular the United States Supreme 
Court. Given the well-defined and narrow scope and nature of appel-
late review, it is reasonable to presume a diminished role for parties 
and advocates and a primary role for the court.23 
19 These cases are Gurary v. Winehouse (190 F.3d 37 [2d Cir. 1999]), Morris 
v. Wachovia Sec., Inc. (448 F.3d 268 [4th Cir. 2006]), and Thompson v. Rela-
tionServe Media, Inc. (610 F.3d 628 [11th Cir. 2010]). 
20 All of the problems we’ve described repeat at the appellate level. There is, 
of course, another appellate body, the Supreme Court, but we know of no case 
in which it opined on this statutory requirement. There is also reason to be-
lieve that some of the problems we’ve described may be reduced, simply by 
virtue of the additional judges involved in appeals, whether it is because they 
are checks against slacking, sources of information, or other reasons. 
21 [Cites.] 
22 And everywhere else, for that matter. 
23 We suspect, though, that the role of appellate attorneys as agenda-setters 
is an important one. See, e.g., Baker and Biglaiser (2013); Mak, Sidman, and 
Sommer (2013). 
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Second, as a practical matter, data on litigant characteristics and 
activity is less accessible than data on judicial characteristics and opin-
ions. Until recently, it was essentially inaccessible. Today, though, the 
expanded coverage of motions and other litigation materials on 
Westlaw, Bloomberg BNA, and other sites, and the now-universal 
adoption of PACER by the federal courts make possible datasets that 
incorporate rich data on both judicial characteristics and litigant be-
havior. 
How might litigant behavior be an important determinant of judi-
cial behavior in the context of this paper? Under the perfect agent ac-
count, litigant behavior is essential irrelevant, because section 
21D(c)(1) makes Rule 11(b) findings mandatory; the filing of a motion 
or a request for sanctions is unnecessary. Once we consider that judges 
may have reasons (for example, informational, effort-based, or ideolog-
ical) not to make required Rule 11(b) findings, we see that litigant be-
havior is key. If the litigants do not raise the issue, then the district 
court need not act, and may not even know they are obligated to act. 
Litigants may even try to prevent court compliance with the statute by 
hinging settlements on sanctions findings not being made. Courts may 
be reluctant to upset a settlement to comply with the statute, both be-
cause it will be more work for the judge, and also because parties 
forced into arguments about sanctions are unlikely to make them vig-
orously. Moreover, if the court does not raise the issue over the parties 
sitting on their rights, there will be no one to make the lack of findings 
an issue on appeal. 
This in turn leads us to an account of litigant behavior. What might 
determine litigants’ willingness to raise the issue of compliance with 
the need to make findings under section 21D(c)(1)? Higher stakes liti-
gation is correlated with higher litigation costs (Lee and Willging 
2010). Since under section 21D(c)(1) an award of attorney fees is the 
presumptive sanction for a Rule 11 violation, the benefits of pushing 
for Rule 11 findings go up as the stakes rise. All else equal, therefore, 
we would expect cases with higher stakes and higher litigation costs to 
have a greater likelihood of a section 21D(c)(1) finding. 
It is also worth noting that much private securities litigation is 
handled by a limited number of highly sophisticated, highly experi-
enced, repeat players, both on the plaintiffs’ and the defendants’ side.  
These repeat play dynamics may affect the willingness of a party (read: 
the party’s attorneys) to push for findings at the end of a case. Which 
direction this cuts, however, is not clear a priori. Sophisticated plain-
tiffs’ attorneys may ensure that pushing for Rule 11 findings will be 
futile, or they may be able to deter requests for Rule 11 findings with 
the threat to “punish” the opposing law firm in future cases. On the 
other hand, the fact that the potentially sanctioned firm is a repeat 
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player may raise the benefits of seeking Rule 11 findings for the re-
peat-player defense firm. 
To test this account, we look at proxies for the stakes of the case 
(class action status) and for the expenditures on attorney fees (total 
number of docket entries). We also proxy for aggressive litigation 
strategy and litigant emphasis on sanctions by looking at sanctions ac-
tivity within a lawsuit.  
3. Data Description and Summary Statistics 
Before turning to the task of testing the predictions of these ac-
counts against the data, we briefly describe the data we use. As our 
goal is to document rates of (non-) compliance with section 21D(c)(1), 
our data must include a set of finally adjudicated private securities 
lawsuits and sufficient information about each case to determine 
whether the required findings have been made. The usual, and easiest, 
method of gathering judicial opinions from Westlaw or other online 
sources is, unfortunately, inadequate to this task, as these databases 
do not capture all district court opinions, orders, and judgments.24 For 
this reason, any attempt to rely on these databases will inevitably suf-
fer from a “denominator problem”: no matter how many, or how few, 
opinions we identify that make section 21D(c)(1) findings, we cannot 
tell what share of the total these opinions represent. Further, they are 
likely to disproportionately omit certain types of final adjudication as 
well, such as settlements and jury verdicts. 
For this reason, we gather our data from a source that allows us to 
gather a comprehensive set of information about private securities cas-
es in federal court, but which also presents its share of complications. 
We construct by hand a dataset of PACER docket records and court or-
ders in all private securities lawsuits filed in federal court from 1994 to 
2008. The data collection and processing is important but complex and 
detailed, and therefore we describe it in detail in the Appendix.  
The collection and processing of the data left us with 1,039 cases for 
which we were able to gather a complete, text-searchable set of docket 
records and final orders and judgments, which were candidates to con-
tain section 21D(c)(1) findings. Of these cases, 140, or 13.5 percent, ac-
tually had such findings. In 125 of the 140 cases with the required 
findings, the findings appeared in a court order approving a settle-
ment. Descriptive statistics for this sample appear in Table 1. 
24 The criteria used for inclusion in these databases are opaque and have var-
ied over time. For the time period that is the subject of our study, the criteria 
for publication to the Westlaw online database, for example, varied by dis-
trict, and would depend on a mix of judges marking opinions for publication 
and Westlaw editors selecting opinions for publication. 
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4. Results 
The potential accounts of judicial and litigant behavior outlined 
above show a large number of factors that could influence judicial be-
havior in light of the requirements of section 21D(c)(1). In our data, we 
have direct measures of some factors, such as the timing of appellate 
decisions on section 21D(c)(1), and proxies for other factors, such as ju-
dicial ideology scores and measures of docket activity. Table 2 present 
the results of a series of logistic regressions that test for the relation-
ships hypothesized in the accounts described in section 2. All results 
include controls for circuit, and for ease of interpretation, our tables 
present marginal effects (evaluated at mean values of continuous vari-
ables) rather than logit coefficients.25 
4.1 Testing the Perfect Agent Account 
The hypothesis that judges are perfect agents in complying with 
section 21D(c)(1) is easy to reject. The observed compliance rate is un-
der 14 percent. This suggests that judges either do not know the law or 
do not follow the law except when it is in their interests to do so. In an 
area as specialized as securities law, it is plausible that generalist 
judges do not know details, such as section 21D(c), unless the lawyers 
bring it to their attention. If this is the case, then whether judges fol-
low the law depends entirely on the incentives of the litigants, and 
mandatory commands to judges make less sense. 
Moreover, as column (5) of Table 2 indicates, the relationship be-
tween sanctions activity (our admittedly poor proxy for weak merits) 
and section 21D(c)(1) findings is essentially zero. This suggests the 
merits of the underlying matter are not the only, and perhaps not even 
a significant, factor in the decision to comply with the law. In other 
words, as we describe more fully below, the incentives of the parties to 
raise the issue of a mandatory requirement with the court are not cor-
related with the behavior of the parties – in fact, as we show, they are 
likely inversely correlated. 
4.2 Testing the Learning Account 
The learning account—that generalist judges learn about law over 
time as they get more experience with securities cases—gets some 
traction. Column (1) of Table 2 presents results in which the right-
hand-side variables are limited to measures of the exposure of judge to 
25 Results without controls for circuit are virtually identical, as are results for 
regressions using a linear probability model, with one exception as noted be-
low in section 4.5.  
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post-PSLRA securities cases: are time (in years) since the effective date 
of the PSLRA; a (logged) count of the post-PSLRA securities cases ter-
minated by the judge up to and including the judge’s decision in the 
current case; and a (logged) count of the past post-PSLRA securities 
cases terminated in the judge’s district up to and including the judge’s 
decision in the current case.26 The variables attempt to capture oppor-
tunities for learning about the rule and the gradual “adoption” of a 
practice of making section 21D(c)(1) findings over time. 
There appears to be increasing compliance with section 21D(c)(1) 
over time, with a statistically significant increase of close to 2 percent-
age points in compliance per year (this falls to about 1 percent once the 
remaining covariates are added). Consistent with the learning account, 
greater exposure to post-PSLRA securities cases is associated with 
higher rates of section 21D(c)(1) findings. Judges seem not to be entire-
ly dependent on the parties in every case, since they appear to learn 
from prior cases or from reading other cases or other sources. These 
latter relationships are strong in (unreported) bivariate regressions, 
but are not significant in the combined regression in column (1), likely 
due to collinearity among them.  
4.3 Testing the Judicial Inertia Account 
The account based on limited judicial effort receives mixed support. 
Column (2) of Table 2 adds measures of the seniority and experience of 
the judge: whether the judge was senior status at the time the case 
was terminated; whether the judge was chief judge of the district at 
the time the case was terminated; and whether the judge was con-
firmed after the effective date of the PSLRA.  
We find significant and fairly strong evidence senior status matters 
to compliance. If senior status is a proxy for diminished incentive or 
ability to exert effort to learn about or comply with section 21D(c)(1), 
then this would suggest the costs of compliance are a driver of judicial 
behavior. It is important to note that senior status here is not merely 
serving as a proxy for age or experience, given that chief judges largely 
share these qualities, but no such negative relationship exists between 
chief judge status and section 21D(c)(1) findings.27 Chief judges and 
26 Natural logs of the case counts are used because of the highly skewed dis-
tribution of values across judges. 
27 Another possible explanation for the senior-status finding is that senior 
judges end up (through case reassignment processes) with easier cases than 
full-time judges. If this is true, then the senior-status variable may be instead 
a measure of case complexity. This result would then support our findings 
regarding the number of motions filed being positively correlated with statu-
tory compliance. 
                                               
16  /  HENDERSON & HUBBARD  /  January 10, 2014 
senior judges are likely of similar age and experience, and yet only sen-
ior judges are much less likely to make the required Rule 11(b) find-
ings. This suggests judicial incentives to know and apply the law mat-
ter a great deal to compliance with congressional commands. 
The remaining variables are small in magnitude and not statistical-
ly significant, though they have the predicted sign. 
4.4 Testing the Judicial Ideology Account 
Judicial ideology as a factor in compliance with section 21D(c) re-
ceives no support from the data. Column (3) of Table 2 adds the judge’s 
adjusted common space score to measure judicial ideology and controls 
for race and sex of the judge.  
Given that sanctions are a freighted concept for most lawyers, and 
private securities litigation is a subject of political interest (to which 
the passage of the PSLRA over a presidential veto attests), one might 
expect that ideology would matter in this context. Given the high-
profile nature of many securities class actions and the ideologically 
charged nature of many of these suits – e.g., pitting union pension 
funds against corporate management – one might expect it to matter a 
great deal. But it doesn’t. Nonetheless, this null finding is consistent 
with the observation, noted in Epstein, Landes, and Posner (2013, pp. 
231–37), that the effect of ideology weakens as one moves down the 
appellate chain from the Supreme Court to the district courts. Further, 
given the explicit text of the PSLRA, the meaning of the requirement 
for findings on compliance with Rule 11 is not likely the subject of de-
bate, no matter a judge’s ideology.  
4.5 Testing the Appellate Oversight Account 
The data suggest that appellate oversight affects the rates of com-
pliance among district court judges. Column (4) of Table 2 adds indica-
tor variables for whether, at the time the case was terminated, there 
existed in the circuit appellate precedent in which the circuit court re-
manded a case to the district court for failure to make section 21D(c)(1) 
findings (“Precedent: Remand”) or, after concluding that the district 
court failed to make the required finding, made the required findings 
itself without remand to the district court (“Precedent: No Remand”). 
While the first type of precedent might incentivize district courts to 
make findings, the latter type of precedent may have the opposite ef-
fect, by indicating to district judges that the circuit court will simply 
make the findings for them. 
This latter effect appears to be large and statistically significant in 
the data. In circuits where the appellate court is willing to make find-
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ings rather than forcing the district court to do so, it appears that ap-
pellate oversight actually reduces district court compliance. This 
prompts one to wonder whether the mechanism by which appellate re-
view disciplines district courts is not the reputational harm of reversal 
(for which we find no evidence of an effect) but rather through a rever-
sal and remand imposing direct costs in time and effort on the district 
judge. 
The former effect is small and not statistically significant, and 
shows considerable sensitivity to variations in the sample scope or use 
of a linear probability model. Thus, this result should be interpreted 
with caution. 
4.6 Testing the Role of the Litigant Behavior 
Litigant behavior appears to be a major explanatory factor of com-
pliance with the law. Column (5) of Table 2 adds measures of the ex-
tent and intensity of litigation activity in the case: a dummy variable 
for cases in which “class action” or “class certification” appear in the 
docket sheet, indicating a putative class action; a (logged) count of the 
number of docket entries in the docket sheet; and a (logged) count of 
the number of times the stem “sanction!” appears in the docket sheet.28  
The coefficient on docket entries is large and highly statistically 
significant. Because the counts are logged, the coefficient of 0.066 for 
docket entries roughly means that a doubling of the number of docket 
entries is associated with a 6 percentage point increase (relative to a 
baseline rate of 13.5 percent) in the likelihood of findings, which is a 
very strong relationship given that the range of the number of docket 
entries in a case spans several orders of magnitude. While the class ac-
tion indicator is significant in a bivariate regression, it is not signifi-
cant when the number of docket entries is included as a covariate, 
which suggests that the class action indicator and the measure of 
docket activity are both proxies for the same thing, which we interpret 
to be the volume of litigation activity in a case. Thus, bigger, longer, or 
more complex cases are more likely to have Rule 11(b) findings re-
quired by section 21D(c)(1).  
Interestingly, though, the most obvious explanation—that in big 
cases, litigants have an incentive to push for section 21D(c)(1) sanc-
tions—does not suffice. As column (5) of Table 2 indicates, our measure 
of sanctions activity is essentially uncorrelated with section 21D(c) 
findings. Indeed, the vast majority of section 21D(c)(1) findings (125 
out of 140) appear in the context of court approval of a proposed set-
28 We use the natural log of the docket entry and sanction activity variables 
to account for their highly skewed (and indeed approximately lognormal) dis-
tributions. 
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tlement order that contains boilerplate language finding no Rule 11 
violations.29 Yet most orders granting with prejudice a motion to dis-
miss for failure to state a claim do not contain such findings.30 We are 
thus left with the finding that section 21D(c)(1) findings are most like-
ly to appear in cases the parties agreed to ask the court not to award 
sanctions! 
5. Discussion 
This examination of district court (non-) compliance with a manda-
tory requirement of the PSLRA reveals a number of dimensions along 
which judicial behavior may deviate from the perfect agent account of 
judging. Learning or experience with a rule, measured here through 
exposure to the rule, appears to be an important predictor of compli-
ance. Judicial motivation and the cost of compliance, proxied here in 
part by senior status and by the risk of appellate discipline, matters as 
well. On the other hand, judicial ideology has no predictive power in 
this context. 
Notably, the parties and their attorneys seem to play a major role 
in the patterns of compliance. Given the design of section 21D(c)(1), 
this should be surprising. The whole point of a mandatory requirement 
that the court make findings on Rule 11 compliance in every case is, 
presumably, to take away from the litigants, and even from the judge, 
the decision of whether to make such findings. But as we noted above, 
every sanctions rule, whether styled as self-executing or not, relies on 
either the parties or the court to invoke it in a particular case.  
Reliance on the court, we have found, is imperfect. Factors such as 
judicial experience and exposure to securities cases are correlated with 
patterns of compliance, despite their utter irrelevance to the rule. But 
what about the litigants? Why aren’t defendants (or plaintiffs, for that 
matter) consistently demanding such findings? 
Reliance on the parties is imperfect as well. (This fact explains the 
mandatory feature of the statute in the first place; if the parties were 
perfect agents of Congress in moving for sanctions, the statute would 
be unnecessary.) Although findings may lead to sanctions, and sanc-
29 A representative example of such text is, “The Court finds that during the 
course of the Litigation, the Parties and their respective counsel at all times 
complied with the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.” Final 
Judgment and Order of Dismissal with Prejudice, p. 5, In re Dura Pharma-
ceuticals, Inc. Securities Litigation, 99-CV-00151 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 1999). 
30 Manual review (both in and out of the sample used for regression analysis) 
revealed hundreds of such orders, despite our ability to find only 15 in-
sample cases that arguable contained section 21D(c) findings and not involv-
ing settlements. 
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tions potentially yield monetary returns to a party, it is likely a rare 
case in which a party has incentive to press for findings under section 
21D(c)(1). Moving the court to make findings is itself a costly undertak-
ing. There are likely to be few cases in which the monetary returns to 
seeking sanctions justify seeking sanctions. The rates at which courts 
issued sanctions prior to the PSLRA were exceedingly low (indeed, sec-
tion 21D(c)(1) presumably responds to this fact), which suggests that 
there are few cases in which litigants see it in their self-interest to 
pursue sanctions. Further, attorneys may be repeat players with the 
opposing counsel and with the court. Therefore, even when it may be in 
the interest of a litigant to seek sanctions, the attorneys may not want 
to do so, lest they antagonize the opposing counsel or the court, who 
may impose penalties against them in later periods.  
We can further explore the incentives of the participants by consid-
ering two types of cases. First, consider those cases where a party 
would find it worthwhile to move for Rule 11 sanctions, or where a fil-
ing was so clearly frivolous that, even without the command from the 
PSLRA, the court would raise the issue of sanctions sua sponte. In 
these cases, a motion will be made or the court will bring the issue up 
on its own.31 As such, the statute is unnecessary, since Rule 11, per-
mits parties to make motions and courts to consider sanctions sua 
sponte. We know that such cases were exceedingly rare before the 
PSLRA, maybe 1 or 2 percent of private securities cases.32 This scenar-
io would easily account for the 15 out 1,029 cases in the sample (1.5 
percent of cases) where section 21D(c)(1) findings appeared outside of 
the settlement context. 
Second, consider those cases where no party would find it worth-
while to raise a sanctions motion, and the court is unconcerned about a 
Rule 11 violation. But for the PSLRA, no party would move for Rule 11 
findings, nor would the judge raise the issue. To what extent does the 
PSLRA change behavior? Our findings indicate that the answer is “not 
that much.” The judge has little incentive to make findings (other than 
a desire to “follow the law”), given that the parties will not press the 
issue. So we might predict—consistent with our results based on prox-
ies for effort or motivation—that a judge will do so only when the effort 
31 The appeals court is also relevant here, since if the participants below do 
not believe the case is obvious, but the appeals court does, the same result 
obtains. 
32 A Third Circuit Task Force on Rule 11 found that for one year (1987–1988) out of 
over 21,000 cases decided, there was Rule 11 activity in only about 120 of them, or 
about 0.6 percent of cases.  Burbank (1989). Our calculations using this data and da-
ta from the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts, suggests the use of Rule 11 was 
more common in securities cases: there was Rule 11 activity in about 1.4 percent of 
securities cases in the Third Circuit in that year.  
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involved is minimal. This would be the case if the judge could get by 
with boilerplate findings. 
Further, given that neither party has incentive to demand sanc-
tions, we might expect the issue of findings under section 21D(c)(1) to 
arise only in situations where someone else might seek to intervene in 
the case, using non-compliance with section 21D(c)(1) as a basis for 
demanding court action. Such a scenario may actually arise with some 
frequency in large, complex securities class actions, which usually end 
in settlements. Here, both the defendant (and its attorneys) and the 
plaintiffs’ attorneys see a settlement in their best interests, but absent 
class members may feel shortchanged by the settlement, or may wish 
to use objections to the settlement as a means of obtaining a better 
outcome for themselves. The parties, therefore, have an incentive to 
ensure that the settlement proceedings assiduously comply with any 
rules that could be invoked by objecting class members.  
This, we surmise, is why we find the otherwise paradoxical result 
that not only is section 21D(c)(1) largely ignored by courts, but its re-
quired findings are almost exclusively made only in the cases where 
neither party wants the court to award sanctions. As noted above, in all 
but 15 cases with section 21D(c)(1) findings, the findings appeared as 
boilerplate in a proposed settlement order that was approved (in most 
cases, adopted verbatim) by the court.33 
6. Conclusion 
The conventional wisdom among practicing securities lawyers was 
that courts did not comply with section 21D(c)(1), and that therefore it 
is a worthless law. While our findings support the first claim and we 
can reject a naïve view that judges automatically “follow the law,” we 
cannot be sure about the value of the law, since it may be valuable in 
subtle ways that again reflect the interplay of the incentives of judges, 
parties, and attorneys.  
Section 21D(c)(1) may still be effective because it may force the par-
ties to settle, to settle more quickly, or to lower the settlement returns 
33 An additional indication that the impetus for inclusion of this boilerplate is 
the parties and not the court is the fact that occasionally a settlement agree-
ment will include an explicit agreement of the parties not to pursue Rule 11 
sanctions but no boilerplate findings of compliance with the PSLRA. These 
agreements are approved verbatim by the court without the addition of sec-
tion 78u-4(c) findings—even boilerplate ones. See, e.g., Stipulation of Volun-
tary Dismissal and Order, In re Business Objects S.A. Securities Litigation, 
3:04-CV-02401 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2005); Stipulation and Order of Dismissal 
with Prejudice, In re Solutia, Inc. Securities Litigation, 4:03-CV-03554 (N.D. 
Cal. Jan. 13, 2005). 
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for marginal cases. This may be the case, even though we do not ob-
serve the statute producing motions for sanctions or court-ordered 
hearings about sanctions. If parties know that courts will, on the mar-
gin, be more likely to consider sanctions, or that the opposing counsel, 
empowered by the statute,34 may be more likely to move for sanctions, 
some marginal claims may be deterred.  
Another way that this type of judicial warning can be effective at 
deterring borderline claims, yet be unobserved in the rates of section 
21D(c)(1) compliance, is through the strategic use—by both judges and 
plaintiffs—of the granting of a motion to dismiss without prejudice. 
Most plaintiffs in securities actions (and virtually all other actions, for 
that matter) are granted leave to amend at least once before their 
complaints are dismissed with prejudice. At this point, the judge may 
remind the plaintiff of application of Rule 11 to the amended pleading, 
or the defendants’ attorneys may do so off-the-record. The plaintiff 
with a borderline complaint now has a way to save himself the risk of 
sanctions under section 21D(c)(1) and the court the trouble of making 
the findings: since the order granting the motion to dismiss was with-
out prejudice, the order is not a “final adjudication” within the mean-
ing of section 21D(c)(1), but if the plaintiff does not file amended com-
plaint within the time given for repleading, the case closes. In this 
way, cases that effectively are dismissals with prejudice slip beyond 
the seemingly comprehensive scope of the PSLRA. 
We therefore cannot say that section 78u-4(c) of the PSLRA is inef-
fective in achieving the statute’s underlying goal of raising the cost of 
frivolous securities litigation. What we can say is that the naïve view 
that judges simply know and then follow the law is unsupported by our 
data. Instead, the way the courts apply this law is the outcome of a 
much more complex process, one involving both the courts’ own incen-
tives and those of the parties.  
This is not necessarily a bad thing. After all, one might judge the 
PSLRA misguided insofar as it insists that judges make findings that 
in most cases neither the parties nor the judge would think are any-
thing more than a waste of time. A collective decision, whether con-
scious or not, to avoid a pointless exercise seems to be at worst what a 
judge might, in other contexts, call “harmless error.”  
But these results are a reminder that it is not enough for Congress 
to declare an action an obligation for the action to be undertaken. The 
obligations have to be designed in ways that speak to the incentives of 
the actors in the legal system who will undertake the desired action.  
At least in contexts similar to the one we study here, it may be more 
34 Pointing to the statute may be a lower cost way of raising the issue of sanc-
tions, since courts or the lawyers can also fall back on the claim that they 
were just following the law in their pursuit of sanctions. 
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sensible for Congress to focus legal requirements on the parties instead 
of judges, since the former appear to be the main drivers of knowledge 
of and compliance with the law. 
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Appendix: Appellate Cases 
Bondiett v. Novell, Inc. 141 F.3d 1184 (10th Cir. 1998) (noting failure 
of district court to make required findings, but holding that this failure 
did not make the court’s judgment not final and thus not appealable) 
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Gurary v. Winehouse, 190 F.3d 37 (2d Cir. 1999) (“Gurary I”) (remand-
ing to district court to make findings per statutory requirement) 
Simon DeBartolo Group, L.P. v. Richard E. Jacobs Group, Inc., 186 
F.3d 157, 177-78 (2d Cir. 1999) (affirming grant of sanctions but re-
manding to the district court to reconsider the amount of sanctions ap-
propriate under the statute given the frivolous findings involved only 
one claim in a multi-claim action) 
Gurary v. Winehouse (“Gurary II”), 235 F.3d 792 (2d Cir. 2000) (revers-
ing district court and directing imposition of sanctions) 
Smith v. Lenches, 263 F.3d 972 (9th Cir. 2001) (affirming district court 
ruling denying defendant’s motion for sanctions) 
Baltia Air Lines, Inc. v. CIBC Oppenheimer Corp., 6 Fed. Appx. 106 
(2d Cir. 2001) (remanding for district court to make findings as per the 
statute) 
Dellastatious v. Williams, 242 F.3d 191 (4th Cir. 2001) (denying cross-
appeal for sanctions without remand) 
Oxford Asset Management, Ltd. v. Jaharis, 297 F.3d 1182 (11th Cir. 
2002) (affirming grant of sanctions but remanding to redetermine 
amount based on appellate determination that one claim was non-
frivolous) 
Professional Management Associates. Inc. v. KPMG LLP, 345 F.3d 
1030 (8th Cir. 2003) (reversing denial of sanctions, and remanding to 
impose sanctions) 
Hartmarx Corp. v. Abboud, 326 F.3d 862 (7th Cir. 2003) (reversing dis-
trict corut grant of sanctions pursuant to the statute) 
De La Fuente v. DCI Telecommunications, Inc., 82 Fed. Appx. 723 (2d 
Cir. 2003) (affirming district court’s grant of sanctions) 
Rombach v. Chang, 355 F.3d 164, 178 (2d Cir.2004) (remanding where 
the district court did not make the required statutory findings) 
Morris v. Wachovia Securities, Inc., 448 F.3d 268 (4th Cir. 2006) (af-
firming district court finding of Rule 11 violation, but remanding to 
impose sanctions as a result, as required by the statute) 
Endovasc, Ltd. v. J.P. Turner & Co., LLC, 169 Fed. Appx. 665 (2d Cir. 
2006) (remanding for more detailed findings by district court; “The dis-
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trict court’s statement that it could not find “that the Complaint was 
filed for an improper purpose, that it presented a frivolous legal posi-
tion or completely lacked evidentiary support,” does not satisfy the re-
quirements of section 27(c).”) 
Morris v. Wachovia Sec., Inc., 448 F.3d 268, 276 (4th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he 
Rule 11(b) inquiry is mandatory even if other claims in the action arise 
under other laws.”) 
Lowery v. Blue Steel Releasing, Inc., 261 Fed. Appx. 17 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(affirming district court ruling denying defendant’s motion for sanc-
tions) 
Foster v. Wilson, 504 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2007) (reversing district court 
award of sanctions on ground lawyers did not have notice and right to 
defend their actions) 
ATSI Communs., Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 579 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(affirming granting of sanctions by district court, but remanding for 
determination of whether defendant, who waited to be invited by dis-
trict court to seek sanctions, unnecessarily delayed sanctions inquiry, 
thus inflating costs of litigation and thus sanctions award) 
Citibank Global Markets, Inc. v. Rodriguez Santana, 573 F.3d 17 
(2009) (holding that statutory requirement obtains even if all securities 
claims dismissed on state law grounds, but concluding, without re-
mand, that no sanctions warranted) 
Brunig v. Clark, 560 F.3d 292 (5th Cir. 2009) (reversing district court 
award of sanctions on ground lawyers did not have notice and right to 
defend their actions) 
Kelter v. Associated Financial Group, Inc., 382 Fed. Appx., 632 (9th 
Cir. 2010) (affirming district court ruling denying defendant’s motion 
for sanctions) 
Ledford v. Peeples, 605 F.3d 871 (11th Cir. 2010) (affirming grant of 
sanctions but remanding to modify some of the details) 
Thompson v. RelationServe Media, Inc., 610 F.3d 628, 637–39 and n. 
16 (11th Cir. 2010) (remanding for compliance with statutory obliga-
tion) 
Libaire v. Kaplan, 395 Fed. Appx. 732, 736 (2d Cir. 2010) (affirming 
award of sanctions by district court) (affirming finding that dismissal 
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for time-barred claims was “final adjudication” triggering mandatory 
sanction determination) 
Scotto v. Brady, 410 Fed. Appx. 355 (2d Cir. 2010) (remanding for dis-
trict court to make findings re compliance with Rule 11) 
Fishoff v. Coty, Inc., 634 F.3d 647 (2d Cir. 2011) (affirming district 
court ruling denying defendant’s motion for sanctions) 
Beleson v. Schwartz, 419 Fed. Appx. 38 (2d Cir. 2011) (remanding 
where district court did not make the required statutory findings) 
Kazenercom TOO v. Ibar Development, LLC, 464 Fed. Appx. 588 (9th 
Cir. 2011) (reversing order denying sanctions as premature) 
City of Livonia Employees’ Retirement System and Local 295/Local 
851, IBT v. Boeing Company, 711 F.3d 754 (7th Cir. 2013) (remanding 
for district court to make required findings under statute) 
Appendix: Compiling the Dataset 
 
We began with the set of all civil cases filed in federal court from 
1994 through 2008, and terminated by December 31, 2012, that are 
coded as “securities” cases by the Administrative Office of the United 
States Courts (AO). These cases were drawn from data on all civil cas-
es filed in the federal courts published by the Federal Judicial Center 
(2005a-d, 2006a-b, 2007, 2009a-b, 2011, 2013). Information on the dis-
trict, office, and docket number of each case allowed us to uniquely 
identify these cases on PACER, the web-based interface for accessing 
federal court filings. The AO data gave us a list of 20,975 docket num-
bers in securities cases. 
We then downloaded the docket sheets for each of these cases. Be-
cause we were unable to download docket sheets for some docket num-
bers, we obtained a total of 20,622 docket sheets from PACER. We then 
conducted textual analysis of these docket sheets to exclude categories 
of securities cases that were outside the scope of the PSLRA, such as 
cases in which the government (most often the Securities and Ex-
change Commission) was a party or cases that merely involved motion 
to confirm or vacate an arbitral award in an arbitration between, for 
example, an investor and a securities broker. We also attempted to re-
move cases that were simply member cases in consolidated actions. 
This left us with 14,838 docket sheets.35  
35 To be precise, we exclude cases in which the civil cover sheet lists the juris-
dictional basis as “U.S. Government plaintiff” or “U.S. Government defend-
ant”; the case named contained “Securities and Exchange Commission” “SEC” 
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Each docket sheet contains a series of docket entries, in which each 
order entered or pleading or motion filed in the case is recorded. Our 
14,838 docket sheets contained a total of 818,185 docket entries, and it 
is this set of docket entries that we searched for ordered that might 
contain section 21D(c)(1) findings. The first stage of our search for sec-
tion 21D(c)(1) findings involved the automated text parsing of our da-




• Final orders;38 
• Certain other orders granting dispositive motions;39 
• Sanctions orders;40 
• Order approving settlements.41 
 
“CFTC” or “Commodity Futures Trading Commission”; the docket sheet any-
where contained “arbitral” “NASD” or “abitrat!”; or the cover sheet contained 
“lead case:” “relÂ case:” “related case:” “rel case:” “CONSOL” “MEMBER” 
“RELTD”. Note that “!” is used in this context to indicate that the preceding 
string is a word stem; i.e., it represents a wild card of any length of charac-
ters. 
36 To streamline processing, before parsing the text as indicated below, we 
removed all instances of the following terms “copy of” “amended” “clerk!” “re-
vised” “and” “memorandum” “,” “.” “*”. 
37 The docket entry contained “judgment” or “judgement” in the first 25 char-
acters. 
38 The docket entry began with “opinion” or “order” and the docket entry con-
tains “with prej!” “w prej!” “w/ prej!” “without leave to amend” “w/o leave to 
amend” “w/out leave to amend” “den!” “leave to amend” or “order of dismis-
sal”. 
39 The docket entry began with “opinion” “order” and the docket entry con-
tained “summary judgment” “SJ” “MSJ” “MTD” or “dismiss!” and the docket 
entry contained “grant!” (“entry” and “judgment”) (“enter!” and “judgment”) 
“MTD” (“dismiss!” and “entir!”) “dismissing case” “case is dismissed” or “ter-
minat!” and the docket entry did not contain “w/out prej” “w/o prej” “with 
leave to amend” “12(b)(2)” or “12b2”. 
40 The docket entry began with “opinion” or “order” and the docket entry con-
tained “Rule 11” “Procedure 11” “Proc 11” “FRCP 11” “P 11” “sanction!” 
“21D(c)” or “78u!”. 
41 Recall that settlements of certified class actions must be approved by court 
order. The criteria in this case were that the docket entry began with “opin-
ion” “order” “stipulation and order” “Settlement order” or “agreed order” and 
the docket entry contained “settle! or “sttl!” or “stlm!” and either “approv! or 
(“award!” and (“attorney!” or “atty!”) and “fee!”), but not “denied” “de-
ny!” “conf!” “mediation” or “preliminar!” 
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We then attempted to download the order associated with that 
docket entry. For many docket sheets, however, especially older ones, 
the docket entries did not contain working links to PDFs of the under-
lying order. For docket entries with working links, we downloaded the 
orders associated with these entries, and these orders formed the set of 
documents reviewed in the second stage of our automated search.  
In this stage, we attempted to search the text of each order for lan-
guage indicating section 21D(c)(1) findings. We first checked whether 
the PDF image was text-searchable by searching the image for the 
word “court” (which should of course appear in every order). Based on 
this test, we were left with 6,023 orders from 2,150 cases. We then 
searched these orders for indicia of section 21D(c)(1) findings. If any of 
the following terms appeared in the document, we flagged the order for 
manual review: 
 
• “78u-4(c)”  
• “Rule 11” 
• “Procedure 11” 
• “Proc 11” 
• “FRCP 11” 




This text parsing yielded 937 orders in 421 cases flagged for manu-
al review. Subsequent manual review determined that there were 317 
orders from 229 cases with language at least arguably reflecting sec-
tion 21D(c)(1) findings. (Perhaps 306 clearly contain findings.)  
The fact that only about half of the cases flagged by the automated 
process in fact had section 21D(c)(1) language reflects the deliberately 
over-inclusive search terms. As a check for potential under-inclusion of 
orders, we conducted a manual review of over 200 orders that were not 
flagged, including all 129 orders in the text-searchable set that con-
tained “78u” but not “78u-4(c).” Of these orders none contained lan-
guage even arguably constituting section 21D(c)(1) findings.42 
To complete the construction of our dataset, we then scraped case 
information from the docket sheets on each of the cases within the 
scope of our study for which we had docket sheets. This information 
included start and end dates for the litigation, the assigned judge’s 
42 An additional manual review of all text-searchable orders downloaded from 
PACER for 200 cases revealed only two cases in which section 21D(c)(1) lan-
guage appeared but was not flagged by the automated search algorithm. This 
implies an error rate of 1 percent. In both cases, it appears the failure was 
due to errors in the PDF-to-text conversion. 
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name, and counts of the numbers of dockets entries and the numbers of 
mentions of the stem “sanction!” We then merged this data with the 
data on cases containing section 21D(c)(1) findings and data on which 
cases had docket sheet hits and which cases had text-searchable or-
ders. Information on judicial characteristics was provided courtesy of 
Thomas J. Miles, who has constructed a dataset of district judge char-
acteristics for a paper published in this volume. 
The final step of processing was to remove the remaining consoli-
dated cases that evaded our earlier screen at the docket-sheet parsing 
stage. When a judge terminated more than one securities case in a sin-
gle day, we removed all but one instance of that case. This is to avoid 
double-counting a single order (and thus a single act of making section 
21D(c)(1) findings) that applies to cases with different docket num-
bers.43 We then focused on cases in which all of the downloaded docu-
ments were text searchable.44 This left us with 1,039 cases, decided by 
454 unique judge-district pairs from 78 districts.45 For purposes of the 
analysis herein, these cases are the relevant sample—the set of cases 
in which we could have found section 21D(c)(1) findings. Of these cas-
es, 140, or 13.5 percent, had section 21D(c)(1) findings.46 In 125 of the 
43 Of course, this method may also remove cases coincidentally decided on the 
same day. Given that our sample period contains over 4 million judge-
workdays and fewer than 2,000 orders, such coincidences are likely to be few. 
In addition to same-day, same-judge cases, five cases were excluded on the 
grounds that manual revealed they were out of scope, as they involved a gov-
ernmental plaintiff, arbitration review, or a dismissal on jurisdictional or 
venue grounds, and 33 cases were excluded because of missing termination 
date information. 
44 As a robustness check, we also conducted the analysis below using a da-
taset that included all cases with both text-searchable and non-text-
searchable orders. (The results are available from the authors.) This dataset 
included 1,639 cases and generated summary statistics and regression re-
sults very similar to those reported herein, with one exception noted below in 
section 4.5. It is worth noting that cases with orders that are downloadable 
and text-searchable are not the norm in the sample period. Out of over 14,000 
cases in our initial set of securities cases, only about 2,100 contained working 
links to text-searchable orders.  
45 In our data, unique judge identifiers correspond to unique district-judge 
combinations. A small number of judges have two judge identifiers, as they 
adjudicated cases in two districts. Also, note that these cases with text-
searchable orders are not drawn uniformly over time from the underlying set 
of docket sheets. Unsurprisingly, the prevalence of text-searchable orders 
among all orders increases over time. 
46 As check on the low incidence of Section 21D(c)(1) findings, we ran a search 
in Westlaw of all cases citing section 78u-4. This yielded 4,204 opinions. Bool-
ean text searches of these opinions for references to 78u-4(c), Rule 11, or 
sanctions, yielded 676 hits, and subsequent manual review identified 135 
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140 cases with the required findings, the findings appeared in a court 
order approving a settlement. Descriptive statistics for this sample ap-
pear in Table 1. 
 
opinions, or 3.2 percent of the sample, which either arguably made section 
21D(c)(1) findings or, if they were interlocutory orders, discussed the court’s 
obligation to do so at the conclusion of the litigation. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Min Max 
Docket entries1 92.9 3 1967 
Sanctions mentions2 0.78 0 49 
Case duration (years) 2.00 0.02 (7 days) 10.81 





Adjusted ideology 0.006 –0.666 0.731 
Class Action 0.831   
Confirmed post-
PSLRA 0.511   
Senior status 0.164   
Chief judge 0.106   
Female 0.224   
Black 0.112   
Asian 0.006   
Hispanic 0.045   
After Appellate Rul-
ing: Remand 0.119   
After Appellate Rul-
ing: No Remand 0.091   




1 This is a skewed distribution; the median number of docket entries is 60. 
2 In 89.0% of cases, the word “sanctions” did not appear in the docket sheet. 
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Table 2. Logit Regression Results, All Variables 














































































Class Action     0.034 (0.028) 
Docket Entries     0.066 (0.012)** 
Sanctions Activ-
ity     
–0.005 
(0.012) 
Race and Sex  
Dummies   Y Y Y 
Circuit  
Dummies Y Y Y Y Y 
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